We investigate competitive, selection and reallocation e¤ects in monopolistic competition trade models. We argue that departing from CES preferences in an otherwise standard Dixit-Stiglitz setup with additive preferences seems to involve implausible assumptions about consumer behavior and inconsistent competitive e¤ects. In the presence of trade costs, selection e¤ects à la Melitz (2003) are instead generally robust to the assumptions about preferences. However, they are unambiguously associated to aggregate productivity gains only when preferences are CES. We also study competitive e¤ects in alternative monopolistic competition settings featuring non-additive preferences, strategic interaction and consumers'preference for an ideal variety. We …nd that none of the these setups delivers a compelling pro-competitive mechanism.
…re. 1 The traditional critique that CES preferences make monopolistic competition little interesting due to the implied invariance of markups and …rm size to market size has been recently revived by Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti and Thisse (2011). In their in ‡uential paper, they argue that CES preferences are a knife-edge between cases yielding opposite results, and thus propose a more general D-S monopolistic competition setup with additive preferences and a variable elasticity of substitution. 2 In this paper we argue instead that, although CES preferences are clearly special, their special features may be a strength rather than a weakness when compared to the available modeling alternatives. In particular, although a variable elasticity yields competitive e¤ects in monopolistic competition, such e¤ects seem to stem from ad hoc assumptions about consumer behavior and lead to inconsistent results.
In a celebrated paper, Krugman (1979) developed a simple model featuring additive preferences and D-S monopolistic competition to show that trade opening between identical countries leads to lower markups (the pro-competitive e¤ect of trade) and higher welfare. Crucially, Krugman assumed that the elasticity of substitution is decreasing in individual consumption (henceforth, DES preferences). He claimed (p. 476) that: "This assumption [..] seems plausible. In any case, it seems necessary if this model is to yield reasonable results, and I make the assumption without apology." In this paper we argue instead that DES preferences are implausible, and that they yield no more reasonable competitive e¤ects than in the opposite case in which the elasticity of substitution is increasing in individual consumption (IES preferences).
To motivate our analysis, we propose the following exercise of introspection. Consider a situation in which you are endowed with two red pencils and two blue pencils, and compare it with a situation in which you are endowed instead with ten red and ten blue pencils.
The key question is: do you perceive a red and a blue pencil as more substitutable in the former or in the latter situation? If you think, as we do, that varieties become no more substitutable when consumption of each shrinks, then the DES assumption is violated.
In Section 2, we explore the implications of a variable elasticity of substitution in a framework à la Krugman (1979) . IES preferences imply that a rise in market size leads to 1 In this paper, we refer to monopolistic competition as a market structure characterized by product di¤erentiation, a downward sloping average cost curve and free entry. By Dixit-Stiglitz assumption we refer instead to the absence of strategic interaction among …rms. 2 For a critique of monopolistic competition cum CES see also Neary (2003 Neary ( , 2004 Neary ( , 2009 ). Another recent paper by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) argues that, provided that certain conditions that crucially exploit the properties of CES preferences are satis…ed, gains from trade are invariant to the microeconomic details of the underlying model (conditional on observed trade ‡ows). It also shows, however, that with CES preferences two statistics (the expenditure share on domestic goods and the elasticity of substitution) are su¢ cient to compute gains from trade.
smaller …rms and higher markups. 3 DES preferences, instead, in addition to building on dubious assumptions about consumer behavior, yield contrasting competitive e¤ects that are hard to rationalize. In particular, a rise in market size is pro-competitive when due to (frictionless) trade opening, and anti-competitive when due to productivity growth. Just the opposite is true with IES preferences. More generally, trade liberalization (speci…cally, a fall in the marginal cost of exporting) leads …rms to charge higher markups in either the domestic market (IES preferences) or in the foreign market (DES preferences). Next, we show that the above results hold also in the presence of heterogeneous …rms. More importantly we show that, when trade costs are large enough to induce a partitioning of …rms into exporters and non-exporters (arguably, the empirically relevant case), selection e¤ects à la Melitz (2003) hold independently of the assumptions about preferences.
However, they are unambiguously associated to aggregate productivity gains only when preferences are CES.
In Krugman's (1979) model, the number of …rms n does not directly a¤ect markups. This is because: 1) consumers share the same preferences over a number of characteristics that equals the number of varieties; 2) the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption that …rms do not interact strategically implies that the perceived demand elasticity " equals the elasticity of substitution , and 3) preference additivity implies that is independent of n. 4 Assuming that varies with individual consumption is therefore the only way to obtain competitive e¤ects in this setup. One may suspect, however, that a pro-competitive e¤ect would arise more naturally when relaxing one of the above assumptions, which prevent n from directly impacting ".
In Section 3 we explore these possibilities. We start by relaxing the assumption that preferences are additive. We argue that, even with non-additive preferences, there is no compelling reason for the elasticity of substitution to be directly increasing in n. For instance, when preferences are quasi-linear and quadratic, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , the elasticity of substitution is decreasing in n for given level of individual consumption.
This also implies that, as in the case of DES preferences, the induced pro-competitive e¤ect is entirely driven by the indirect negative impact of n on individual consumption, namely, by the assumption that @ =@c < 0. Instead, when preferences are translog, as in Feenstra (2003) , the elasticity of substitution is directly increasing in n. In both cases, however, just as with DES preferences, a fall in the marginal cost of exporting leads …rms to charge higher markups in the foreign markets. Interestingly, as shown by , this kind of anti-competitive e¤ect implies that trade liberalization may lead to smaller welfare gains than in the CES case.
Demand elasticity may positively depend on the number of …rms also because a tradeinduced increase in n may "crowd" the variety space, thus making varieties closer substitutes. As …rst noted by Pettengill (1979) , this e¤ect cannot be captured by a Dixit-Stiglitz setting, as the latter implicitly assumes that the number of characteristics/varieties equals the number of …rms. We therefore revert to Lancaster's (1979) ideal variety approach to monopolistic competition, where the space of characteristics is …xed and an increase in the number of …rms makes available varieties closer to one another. Contrary to Pettengill's view, we show that even in this setting demand elasticity need not be increasing in n: in order for Lancaster's model to deliver a competitive e¤ect, additional ad hoc assumptions unrelated to the basic framework are required. Otherwise, the ideal variety approach yields no competitive e¤ects, just like the "love for variety" approach cum CES preferences.
Finally, a pro-competitive e¤ect may naturally arise by simply relaxing the D-S assumption that …rms do not interact strategically. We therefore consider Bertrand and Cournot extensions of the basic setup with additive preferences and a variable elasticity, in which n has a direct pro-competitive impact for given . We show that this procompetitive e¤ect can only be relevant when the number of …rms is small, an assumption at odds with monopolistic competition. Moreover, the assumption of CES preferences seems to dominate over the alternative assumptions, both in terms of analytical simplicity and plausibility of the results. Section 4 brie ‡y concludes. Our paper is related to the vast theoretical literature on monopolistic competition and international trade, initiated by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 , Lancaster (1979) , Helpman (1981) , and whose early contributions are systematized in Helpman and Krugman (1985) . 5 It is also closely related to Zhelobodko et al. (2011) , which independently studies how departing from CES preferences in a standard D-S setting leads to opposite results. Their paper does not discuss, however, the plausibility and robustness of these results, a key contribution of our work, which leads us to opposite conclusions. 6 Finally, our work is related to the recent heterogeneous-…rm extensions of the monopolistic competition trade model, and in particular to Melitz (2003) , Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and , the latter studying welfare gains from trade in the presence of a Pareto distribution of …rm productivity and DES-type 5 More recent contributions include Bertoletti (2006) and Murata (2007, 2012) , which discuss a speci…c functional form for DES preferences. 6 Morever, Zhelobodko et al. (2011) does not study how trade costs a¤ect competitive and selection e¤ects, nor the impact of reallocations on aggregate productivity and the case of strategic interactions.
preferences featuring a choke price. 7 
Dixit-Stiglitz Monopolistic Competition with Additive Preferences
We …rst consider the case of symmetric …rms, as in Krugman (1979) , then extend the analysis to a setup with heterogeneous …rms, as in Melitz (2003).
Symmetric Firms
Consider an economy populated by L workers, whose wage is w = 1. Consumers share the same additive and symmetric preferences, represented by the following utility function:
where c i is consumption of variety i, de…ned over a large number N of potential varieties.
Only varieties indexed by i = 1; ::::; n, with n < N , are actually produced. The subutility function u( ) is strictly increasing and concave, and is at least thrice continuously di¤erentiable. In particular, we assume that u 0 ( ) > 0, u 00 ( ) < 0 and u(0) = 0. 8 Firm i produces a di¤erentiated variety with the total cost function T C i = + q i , where q i = c i L is its output, and and are the …xed and marginal cost, both in terms of labor. Firms are symmetric on the cost and demand side, and therefore solve the same problem. In the following, we therefore drop the variety index i.
Utility maximization subject to a budget constraint implies u 0 (c) = (p)p, where p is the price charged by an individual …rm, > 0 is the marginal utility of income, and p = [p 1 ; :::; p n ] is the price vector. Preference additivity implies the elasticity of with respect to each price p to be of the same order of magnitude as 1=n, provided that prices are not disproportionate (see, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, Section 5.3). Thus, under the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) assumption that n is large enough to induce each …rm to treat as a constant, the inverse individual demand for a variety is
7 Dhingra and Morrow (2012) and Mrazova and Neary (2011) also consider a monopolistic competition setting with heterogeneous …rms and a variable demand elasticity. The former paper focuses on the welfare properties of frictionless trade integration, and the latter on the conditions ensuring supermodularity of …rms'pro…t functions with respect to production and market-access costs. 8 Note that U = nu(c) at a symmetric consumption pattern, with nu(c) > u(nc): thus, U embeds a Chamberlinian "taste for variety". Moreover, U is well de…ned over the positive orthant of the relevant Euclidean space: according to standard results, this implies regular and well-behaved demand functions for strictly positive prices and income. and the perceived price elasticity of demand for an individual …rm is
where (c) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties when they are consumed in the same amount c (see the discussion and derivations in the Appendix). 9 The assumption 0 (c) = 0 is the well-known CES case. Krugman (1979) assumed 0 (c) < 0,
i.e., DES preferences, whereas 0 (c) > 0 corresponds to IES preferences. 10 The revenue of an individual …rm is:
We denote marginal revenue and the derivative of marginal revenue, respectively, by R 0 (c) = r 0 (c)= and R 00 (c) = r 00 (c)=( L), where
The …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization implies:
To obtain a unique and well-behaved solution to the problem of pro…t maximization, we assume that the marginal revenue is everywhere positive and decreasing. That is, we assume that r 0 (c) > 0 and r 00 (c) < 0 for all c, with lim c!1 r 0 (c) = 0 and lim c!0 r 0 (c) = 1.
Equations (2), (3), (5) and (7) imply that the pro…t maximizing price can be written
where > 1, m is the price-marginal cost markup, and
9 Note also that "(c) is independent of and L for given c, and that it equals the reciprocal of the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to individual consumption. 1 0 A possible rationalization for IES preferences is that, by their very nature, di¤erentiated varieties of some product can be used to perform either generic or more speci…c tasks. For instance, a blue pencil can be used either to write down a laundry list (for which a red pencil would be equally appropriate) or, jointly with a red pencil, to mark di¤erent types of comments on an exam paper. Hence, a fall in the symmetric endowment of varieties, by reducing the opportunity to use varieties to perform speci…c tasks, may also reduce their substitutability.
Evidently, markups are increasing in individual consumption c with DES preferences, decreasing in c with IES preferences, and constant with CES preferences. Di¤erentiating (3) and using (5) and (6) yields the following expression for 0 :
which implies that
where (c) = r 0 (c) r 00 (c)c > 0 is the reciprocal of the elasticity of marginal revenue. Note that = when preferences are CES. With non-CES preferences, instead, 6 = and both quantities are variable.
Free entry implies zero equilibrium pro…ts:
where and v denote total and variable pro…ts. Using (5) and (8), the free-entry condition can be written as
Di¤erentiating v with respect to c yields:
Variable pro…t is therefore monotonically increasing in individual consumption, which ensures that the equilibrium is unique. Finally, full employment implies that labor demand, n( + cL), equals labor supply, L (equivalently, equilibrium in the goods market implies that individual expenditure, npc, equals income, w = 1). Thus, using (12) and (8) yields:
Note that (12) implicitly de…nes the level of individual consumption consistent with pro…t maximization and free entry as a function c(L; ; ) of market size L, marginal cost , and the …xed cost . The equilibrium number of …rms, n(L; ; ), is instead determined recursively by (14) .
We can now show how individual consumption depends on the model's parameters.
Di¤erentiating (12) with respect to L, and yields:
Noting that
= v = , we obtain the following Lemma 1 Individual consumption is decreasing in market size L and marginal cost , and increasing in the …xed cost , with:
Lemma 1 and sign(m 0 ) = sign( 0 ) immediately imply Proposition 1 With IES (DES) preferences markups are increasing (decreasing) in ( L= ), and …rm size, q(c) = cL, is decreasing (increasing) in market size L.
Costly Trade
We now assume that exporting in an identical foreign market involves an iceberg trade cost > 1. We denote by the subscript x variables related to the export market, and by no subscript those related to the domestic market. Total pro…ts now equal
where v (c) is still given by (12) , and:
By (7), pro…t maximization implies r 0 (c x ) = and r 0 (c) = . Thus:
Eq. (17) implicitly de…nes c x = c x (c; ), with
The zero-pro…t condition, which implicitly de…nes c = c (L; ; ; ), can now be written
Applying the implicit function theorem to (19) and using (13), (17) and (18) yields:
Evidently, a fall of trade costs reduces individual domestic demand for domestic …rms.
It follows that, with DES (IES) preferences, trade liberalization leads domestic …rms to charge lower (higher) markups in the domestic market.
Consider now foreign sales. Di¤erentiating (17) and using (18) and (20) yields:
Thus, a fall of trade costs increases individual demand for foreign varieties. It follows that, with DES (IES) preferences, trade liberalization leads foreign …rms to charge higher (lower) markups.
Discussion
When preferences are IES, a rise in market size leads to higher markups and smaller …rms. These results are the opposite of the pro-competitive and de-fragmentation e¤ects delivered by Krugman's model and by virtually all monopolistic competition trade models departing from CES preferences. Moreover, it can be shown that gains from trade and productivity growth are not ensured in this case. 11 When preferences are DES, however, although a rise in market size is pro-competitive when due to frictionless trade opening (which in this model is isomorphic to a rise in L), it is anti-competitive when due to productivity growth (as captured by a fall in the marginal cost ). Moreover, both cases yield a rise in the …rm size (q = cL) and a fall in the market share (1=n), which therefore turn out to be phenomena unrelated the "competitive e¤ects" identi…ed by the model. The opposite results hold with IES preferences. These contrasting results seem hard to rationalize. In addition, trade liberalization leads …rms to charge higher markups in either the domestic market (IES preferences) or in the foreign market (DES preferences). As far as we know, there is no evidence in support of any of these speci…c implications, which seem at odds with the conventional wisdom about the pro-competitive e¤ects of trade liberalization.
Finally, as for the role played by …xed production costs, note that in monopolistic competition trade models endogenizing technology it is standard to assume that a lower 1 1 This is because a rise in L= has a positive welfare e¤ect due to the induced rise in n (the standard love for variety e¤ect), and a negative welfare e¤ect due to the rise in markups. Conversely, a rise in has a negative welfare e¤ect due to the fall in the real wages (also due to the rise in markups), and a positive welfare e¤ect due to the induced rise in n. It can be shown that a su¢ cient condition for a rise in market size to be welfare increasing is that 0 > 0, where (c) = d ln u=d ln c. Instead, 0 < 0 is a su¢ cient condition for a rise in marginal cost to be welfare decreasing. See also Dhingra and Morrow (2012) for an analysis of the welfare e¤ects of an increase in market size in the presence of a variable demand elasticity and heterogeneous …rms. marginal cost requires a higher …xed cost , e.g., in terms of R&D expenditures (see, among others, Yeaple, 2005 , Bustos, 2011 , Costantini and Melitz, 2007 . This type of technical change would imply even stronger anti-competitive e¤ects with DES preferences. 12 
Heterogeneous Firms
In this section, we show that the above competitive e¤ects hold also in the presence of heterogeneous …rms. More importantly we show that, in the presence of trade costs, Melitz-type selection e¤ects are robust to non-CES preferences. However, only when preferences are CES they are unambiguously associated to aggregate productivity gains.
Following Melitz (2003) we assume that, upon paying a …xed entry cost e , …rms draw their marginal cost 2 ; 1 from a continuous cumulative distribution G( ) with density g( ) and > 0. We also assume a continuum of varieties, we index …rms by their marginal cost and denote individual demand for a -…rm by c( ). Otherwise, the setup is the same as in the previous Section. 
Evidently, high-productivity (low-) …rms are larger (21) and more pro…table (22) , as in Melitz (2003) . Unlike the Melitz model, however, where preferences are CES and markups are constant, with IES (DES) preferences larger …rms charge lower (higher) markups (23) .
Note also that and govern, respectively, relative …rm size and pro…tability.
Zero cuto¤ pro…t condition Denote by the marginal cost cuto¤, namely, the value of satisfying the zero cuto¤ pro…t condition ( ) = 0:
Eq. (24) implicitly de…nes the individual demand for the cuto¤ …rm, c = c ( ; L; ).
Di¤erentiating yields:
Eqs. (25) and (11) also imply that the size of the cuto¤ …rm, q = c L, is decreasing or increasing in (L = ) depending on whether preferences are IES or DES.
Individual demand for a -…rm Pro…t maximization by the cuto¤ …rm implies r 0 (c ) = . Solving for and substituting into r 0 (c) = yields:
Eq. (26) is key to the characterization of the equilibrium, as it implicitly de…nes individual demand for a -…rm, c ( ) = c( ; ; c ). Using c = c ( ; L; ), we can now show how
) varies with , L and . Di¤erentiating (26) with respect to yields:
Rearranging terms and using (25) yields:
Hence, as in Melitz (2003) , individual demand is increasing in the cuto¤ marginal cost .
Similarly, di¤erentiating (26) with respect to L and using (25) yields:
Thus, for given , individual demand is decreasing in market size L and increasing in the …xed cost . Note also that, with IES preferences, (c ) < (c) for c < c; hence, by (11):
Thus …rm size, q = cL, is decreasing in L for given . In contrast, with DES preferences (c ) > (c) for c < c, and hence …rm size is increasing in L.
The following lemma summarizes Lemma 2 Individual demand c( ; ; L; ) is increasing in and and decreasing in L, with
Free-entry condition Free entry implies that expected pro…ts,
equal the sunk entry cost e . Integrating E by parts using (22) , and noting that ( ) = G( ) = 0, yields:
Di¤erentiating E with respect to yields:
where the inequality follows from Lemma 2. Hence, as in Melitz (2003), expected pro…ts are increasing in and the free-entry condition (28) uniquely pins down , thereby de…ning the equilibrium value of c ( ) = c( ; L; ; e ). 13 
Competitive and Selection E¤ ects of a Rise in Market Size
Selection e¤ects The impact of a rise in market size L on the marginal cost cuto¤ can be computed by applying the implicit function theorem to (28) :
1 3 Note that the measure of active …rms n is determined by the budget constraint (or, equivalently, by the full-employment condition), requiring average expenditure to equal 1=n, and thus:
where @ E =@ > 0 by (29) and, using Lemma 2,
Thus, with DES preferences, d =dL < 0: a rise in market size leads to a standard selection e¤ect. Conversely, with IES preferences a rise in market size leads to a rise in and a consequent anti-selection e¤ect, whereby less productive …rms can survive in a larger market. 14 Therefore, as also noted by Zhelobodko et al. (2011) and Dhingra and Morrow (2012), selection e¤ects seem to crucially depend on the assumptions about preferences.
Moreover, as implicitly argued in this recent literature, aggregate productivity gains or losses seem to uniquely depend on whether rises or falls. Below we show, however, that both conclusions are fragile.
Competitive e¤ects The impact of a rise in market size on markups can be obtained by simply studying how a rise in L a¤ects individual consumption. Using (29) and (31) in (30) and rearranging yields:
where dc=dL = @c=@L + (@c=@ ) (d =dL) represents the total impact of L on individual consumption. Note that the …rst two terms in (32) are positive, thereby implying that the last term is negative. Moreover, using Lemma 2:
where the sign of the term in square brackets is independent of . It follows that the sign of dc=dL is the same for all …rms, and must therefore be negative according to (32) .
Thus, as in the baseline model with symmetric …rms, a rise in market size leads to an anti-competitive e¤ect with IES preferences and to a pro-competitive e¤ect with DES preferences. 15 
Reallocation E¤ ects and Aggregate Productivity
We now show that, with non-CES preferences, selection e¤ects are no longer associated to unambiguous changes in aggregate productivity. The reason is that a rise in market size not only leads to a change in the marginal cost cuto¤, it also a¤ects relative …rm output.
To see this note, from (7), that a rise in L a¤ects the output of active …rms through an increase in . 16 Di¤erentiating (7) yields:
Thus, the reallocations induced by a rise in L are in favor of more productive …rms only if 0 < 0, as in this case the induced rise in reduces individual demand for low-…rms relatively less. Instead, if 0 > 0, reallocations are in favor of less productive …rms. 17 Note also that:
where r 000 = u 0000 c + 3u 000 , thus suggesting that the behavior of depends on properties of preferences which are hard to pin down and do not appear to be directly related to the sign of 0 . In particular, although 0 > 0 if and only if > , no general relation can be inferred between the sign of 0 and 0 . As a consequence, selection and reallocation e¤ects may point in opposite directions, leading to an ambiguous overall impact on aggregate productivity. For instance, the selection e¤ect implied by DES preferences ( 0 < 0) may not be associated to aggregate productivity gains if 0 > 0.
More formally, de…ne the average marginal cost as
where
is the distribution of weighted by the corresponding production levels. 18 Aggregate 1 6 As can be seen from (4), a rise in is required to o¤set the demand increase induced by a rise in L. 1 7 Similarly, it can be shown that
, which implies that a rise in market size a¤ects relative output and pro…tability in the same way only in the case of CES preferences, in which = . 1 8 Note that e satis…es the property of invariance of total cost, i.e.,
productivity 1= e is then determined by ( ), which has support ; and depends on G( ) and c( ). Let = 0 be the density function associated to , denote by h = d log =d = = the corresponding so-called reverse hazard rate, and recall that, if two distributions have the same reverse hazard rate, they are identical. We have:
which implies that the reverse hazard rate corresponding to a -…rm depends on its output relative to that of all other …rms with a lower marginal cost. Thus, by governing relative …rm size, a¤ects how market size impacts on aggregate productivity.
For instance, if 0 ; 0 < 0, a simple "reverse hazard rate dominance" argument (see, e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994) shows that a rise in market size, which is associated to a rise in the marginal utility of income from, say, to b , leads to a rise in aggregate productivity. To see this, denote by and b the corresponding distributions, with supports ; and h ; b i , and b < due to the selection e¤ect implied by DES preferences ( 0 < 0). For all …rms active in both market situations, h b ( ) h ( ) due to 0 < 0, thereby implying
and thus e b < e . By the same reasoning, if 0 ; 0 > 0, a rise in market size leads to an unambiguous reduction in aggregate productivity. On the contrary, if the sign of 0 and 0 do not agree, the selection e¤ect (governed by ) and the reallocation e¤ect (governed by ) point in opposite directions, and the impact of a rise in market size on aggregate productivity becomes ambiguous, as it will in general depend on the properties of the distribution G.
We summarize our results in the following Proposition 2 Selection e¤ ects due to a rise in market size are unambiguously associated to aggregate productivity changes only if 0 and 0 agree in sign.
Costly Trade
Our previous results suggest competitive and selection e¤ects to crucially depend on the sign of 0 . We now show how the results change in the presence of trade costs. We assume that selling in an identical foreign market involves a …xed cost of exporting x > 0 and a variable iceberg trade cost > 1. To save space we focus, as in Melitz (2003), on the more interesting case in which trade costs are large enough to induce a partitioning of …rms into exporters and non-exporters. This requires that > x , where x is the marginal cost cuto¤ for exporting …rms.
Using the same notation as in Section 2.1.1, a -…rm's pro…ts in the domestic and foreign markets are given by:
and L is the size of each market. 19 Thus, the marginal cost cuto¤s for exporters and domestic …rms, x and , are implicitly given by:
to be satis…ed. Finally, the free-entry condition is now given by: 20
Selection e¤ects Consider …rst a fall in the variable trade cost . Applying the implicit function theorem to (41) yields:
1 9 Note that a domestic …rm producing only for the foreign market would incur an overall …xed cost equal to + x, which implies that this case cannot arise in equilibrium. For analytical convenience, we can therefore apportion the …xed cost to domestic pro…ts, in this following the heterogeneous-…rms literature.
2 0 The measure of active …rms is given by:
Using the envelope theorem, recalling that @ v =@c = L [m(c)= (c)] > 0 by (13) , and that @ ln c=@ ln = (c)=m(c ) > 0 by Lemma 2, yields:
Thus we can write:
Evidently, a fall of leads to a fall of , a standard selection e¤ect.
Consider now a fall in the …xed cost of exporting x . Proceeding as above yields:
where @ E =@ > 0 and
Hence @ =@ x > 0, implying that a fall in x leads to a fall in . We record our main results in the following Thus, Melitz-type selection e¤ects are robust to the sign of 0 (c). We view these results as a reassuring. As shown in the previous section, however, they are unambiguously associated to aggregate productivity gains only when preferences are CES.
Competitive e¤ects To study how a fall of trade costs a¤ects domestic and foreign Consider now a fall in . By Proposition 3, it leads to a fall in and therefore to a fall in individual consumption of domestic varieties c( ). Thus, it leads to a fall (rise) of domestic markups with DES (IES) preferences. As for individual consumption of foreign varieties, c( ), a fall of has both a positive direct e¤ect an indirect negative e¤ect through . The overall e¤ect is given by:
Recalling that @ ln c( )=@ ln = (c( )) < 0 by (21), and @ ln c( )=@ ln = (c( ))=m(c ) > 0 by Lemma 2, we can write:
where the inequality follows directly from (42). Hence, as in the symmetric-…rm case, a fall of variable trade costs, by increasing c( ), leads to higher (lower) foreign markups with DES (IES) preferences.
We record our main results in the following
Proposition 4 With DES preferences, a fall of either x or leads to lower domestic markups; a fall of ( x ) leads instead to higher (lower) foreign markups. The opposite results hold with IES preferences.
To conclude, as in the baseline model with symmetric …rms, trade liberalization leads to contrasting results, which seems to cast doubt on the competitive e¤ects identi…ed in this Section. In the next Section, we therefore investigate the plausibility of competitive e¤ects in alternative monopolistic competition settings.
Alternative Environments

D-S monopolistic competition with additive preferences implies that markups do not di-
rectly depend on the number of …rms n. This is because: 1) consumers share the same preferences over a number of characteristics that equals the number of varieties (see 1);
2) the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption implies " = (see 3), and 3) additivity implies that is independent of n (see the Appendix). It follows that in this setup a pro-competitive e¤ect can arise only through variation in the level of individual consumption c, and only if 0 6 = 0. For this reason, a D-S setup cum additive preferences may be unsuited to study competitive e¤ects.
In this Section, we therefore consider monopolistic competition environments in which an increase in the number of …rms directly a¤ects demand elasticity, thereby yielding a competitive e¤ect. 21 Building on examples drawn from the received trade literature, we …rst discuss the implications of relaxing the assumption of preference additivity, and then investigate Lancaster (1979)'s ideal variety approach, in which consumers are heterogeneous. Finally, we study strategic interaction à la Bertrand and Cournot in a setting with additive preferences. Perhaps surprisingly, we …nd that none of the above setups seems to yield a compelling pro-competitive mechanism in monopolistic competition.
Non-Additive Preferences
When preferences are additive, as in (1), the elasticity of substitution ij between varieties i and j is independent of the number n of varieties available for consumption (see the Appendix for a proof). The reason is that in this case the marginal rate of substitution between any two varieties is una¤ected by consumption of other varieties. Matters are di¤erent, however, if preferences are non-additive. In particular, at a symmetric consumption pattern (c i = c, i = 1; ::; n), consumption of other varieties may a¤ect the elasticity of substitution between varieties i and j through a direct impact of n on ij (see the Appendix). Hence, non-additive preferences imply a sort of externality of n on the elasticity of substitution. As shown in the following examples, however, the sign and interpretation of this externality are not obvious. 22 
Quasi-Linear Quadratic Preferences
Consider …rst quasi-linear quadratic preferences of the type U (c 0 ; u(c 0 )) = c 0 + u(c 0 ), where c 0 is consumption of a numeraire good, c 0 = [c 1 ; c 2 ; ::; c n ] is consumption of n varieties of some product and
2 1 See Pettengill (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1979) . 2 2 In this respect, it is suggestive that in their discussion of "diversity as a public good", Dixit and Stiglitz (1975: section 4.4) consider a non-additive case in which n enters the utility function without however a¤ecting the marginal rate of substitution between any two varieties. Maximization of (43) with respect to c i subject to a budget constraint yields: 23
c j ; i = 1; :::; n:
Summing (44) across varieties and rearranging yields the direct demand function for variety i:
where p = 1 n P n j=1 p j is the average price of a variety. Note that …rm i's perceived demand is linear in p i under the D-S assumption that it takes n and p as given. Accordingly, the demand elasticity equals (p i =c i ) =b and is therefore decreasing in c i for any given p i .
Consider now the elasticity of substitution. As detailed in the Appendix, ij = e " ji e " ii , where e " ij = e c ij (p j =e c i ) and e " ii = e c ii (p i =e c i ) are the compensated demand-price elasticities, e c ii = @e c i =@p i , e c ij = @e c i =@p j are the corresponding derivatives, and e c i is the compensated demand for variety i. Recall that with quasi-linear preferences there are no income effects on the demand for non-numeraire goods, and thus compensated and uncompensated demand functions coincide, i.e., e c i = c i . Accordingly:
i; j = 1; 2::; n and i 6 = j;
and, for p i = p j , which implies a symmetric consumption of varieties i and j (c i = c j ), the elasticity of substitution is given by:
Evidently, also in this setting the perceived demand elasticity equals the elasticity of substitution.
Next, to see the role played by n, consider …rst a quasi-symmetric equilibrium in which consumption of all third varieties is equal (i.e., c i = c j , c h = c; h = 1; ::; n, i 6 = h 6 = j). In this case, we obtain:
which implies that the elasticity of substitution is decreasing in the number of …rms n (as well as in c i and c). Finally, in a fully symmetric equilibrium (i.e., for c i = c; i = 1; ::; n), the expression for the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties boils down to
The above results show that the number of …rms has a negative direct impact on the elasticity of substitution. This implies that the pro-competitive e¤ect of an increase in market size delivered by this type of preferences in monopolistic competition is entirely driven by …rms'perceived linearity of demand, hence by the fact that, just as in Krugman (1979) , the elasticity of substitution is decreasing in the level of individual consumption.
Moreover, consistent with quasi-linear quadratic preferences being of the DES type, they imply an inverse relationship between markups and marginal costs in a D-S monopolistic competition equilibrium. As a consequence, a fall in the marginal cost of exporting induces higher markups on foreign sales.
Translog Preferences
Another prominent example of non-additive preferences is represented by the translog expenditure function, a ‡exible speci…cation providing a second-order approximation to any functional form (see, e.g., Varian, 1992: ch. 12). Feenstra (2003) has shown that, when preferences are symmetric and homothetic, the log of the expenditure function E(p; U )
can be written as
where b i = 1=n; t ii = t(n 1)=n; t ij = t=n; t > 0; i; j = 1; ::n; i 6 = j; and a 0 can be shown to re ‡ect the welfare gains from a rise in the number of available varieties. Di¤erentiation yields:
where i = p i e c i =E is the expenditure share on variety i. It can be shown that:
Note that, unlike the case of quasi-linear quadratic preferences, at a symmetric equilibrium (in which i = j = 1=n) the elasticity of substitution ( = 1 + nt ) is directly increasing in n, which leads to a strong pro-competitive e¤ect of market size expansion. 24 However, demand elasticity is decreasing in the market share i , which implies that, as in the case of DES-type preferences, a fall in the marginal cost of exporting leads …rms to charge higher markups in the foreign markets. As shown by , this anticompetitive e¤ect implies that trade liberalization may lead to smaller welfare gains than in the CES case.
The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 5 When preferences are quasi-linear and quadratic, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , the elasticity of substitution is decreasing in the number of …rms for given level of symmetric individual consumption (i.e., = (n; c), with @ =@n < 0). Thus, the pro-competitive e¤ ect of a rise in market size is entirely driven by the fact that the elasticity of substitution is decreasing in individual consumption (i.e., @ =@c < 0). When preferences are translog, as in Feenstra (2003), the elasticity of substitution is instead directly increasing in n at a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., = (n), with @ =@n > 0. In both cases, a fall in the marginal cost of exporting leads to higher markups in the foreign market.
Ideal Variety Approach to Monopolistic Competition
In a Dixit-Stiglitz setting, the introduction of new varieties does not crowd the variety space, as the number of characteristics/varieties is the same as the number of …rms. One may argue, however, that a pro-competitive e¤ect may naturally arise in a framework in which an increase in the number of available varieties reduces their distance in a …xed characteristics space, thereby increasing their substitutability. 25 In this Section we show that, surprisingly, this needs not be the case. To make the 2 4 Yet, this cannot be considered a general property of non-additive preferences. Another example of ‡exible functional form for non-additive preferences is the so-called Leontief-Diewert expenditure function (Varian, 1992 , p. 209), which yields an elasticity of substitution that is decreasing in n, just as in the case of quasi-linear quadratic preferences. Speci…cally, in the symmetric and homothetic case the LeontiefDiewert expenditure function can be written as E(p; U ) = U P n i=1 P n j=1 bij p pipj, where bij = b > 0 and bii = b, i; j = 1; :::; n, i 6 = j. If pi = p (and then ci = c) for any i = 1; :::; n, the elasticity of substitution equals (n) = : The free parameter b can be normalized to ensure that > 1, in which case 0 < 0. In any case, the impact of n on the elasticity of substitution is negligible when the number of …rms is large enough. 2 5 See, e.g., Pettengill (1979) on this point. He claims (p. 960) that "one's normal idea of monopolistic competition is that as the number of products in the industry increases, they become closer and closer substitutes". He therefore argues that Lancaster's (1975) ideal variety approach to monopolistic competition is more realistic in this respect. point, we consider Lancaster's (1975 Lancaster's ( , 1979 ) "ideal variety" approach to monopolistic competition. In this setting, consumer preferences are heterogeneous and the aggregate demand for each variety arises from diversity of tastes. In particular, each consumer has a most preferred ("ideal") variety. As described in Helpman and Krugman (1985, pp. 120-21), on which we build in this section, ideal variety means that "when the individual is o¤ered a well-de…ned quantity of the good but is free to choose any potentially possible variety, he will choose the ideal variety independently of the quantity o¤ered and independently of the consumption level of other goods. Moreover, when comparing a given quantity of two di¤erent varieties, the individual prefers the variety that is closest to his ideal product". These assumptions are formalized by assuming that each variety is represented by a point ! on the unit length circumference of a circle, and that preferences for the ideal product are uniformly distributed over across consumers. L is the size (and density) of the population. The utility function of a consumer with ideal variety e ! is assumed to be:
where (!; e !) is the shortest arc distance between ! and e !, and h( ) is the so-called
Lancaster's compensation function, assumed to be positive, non decreasing and generally normalized so that h(0) = 1 (see Lancaster, 1975) . Moreover, it is generally assumed (see, Helpman and Krugman, 1985) that h( ) is strictly increasing and convex, and that
We now show that the above assumptions are insu¢ cient to deliver a pro-competitive impact of entry in this setting. 26 To this purpose, note …rst that individual preferences as in (50) are of the "perfect substitute" type, with a marginal rate of substitution between any two varieties _ ! and • ! equal to:
The above assumptions on h( ) imply that M RS(e !; !) = h( (!; e !)) is an increasing convex function of the arc distance between e ! and !. Utility maximization implies:
where ! 0 = arg min !2 p(!)h( (!; e !)). In the Appendix, following Helpman and Krug-man (1985) we derive total demand, q(!), for a …rm selling variety ! at price p(!), with contiguous competitors ! l and ! r charging prices p(! l ) and p(! r ). In a symmetric equilibrium in which p(!) = p(! l ) = p(! r ) and (! l ; !) = (! r ; !) = 1=n, the price elasticity of total demand is given by
;
is the elasticity of the compensation function. Accordingly, a rise in market size L, by increasing the number of …rms n, also increases " if 0 h > 0, thus yielding a pro-competitive effect. 27 Instead, if 0 h < 0, a rise in market size decreases " and is therefore anti-competitive.
, " is independent of n, just as in the "love for variety" approach when preferences are CES. Thus, a pro-competitive e¤ect is unwarranted even in a framework in which an increase in the number of …rms crowds the variety space.
There are two main reasons for this result. First, given that (50) assumes that varieties are of the "perfect substitute" type, and thus their elasticity of substitution is constant, a crowding of the variety space cannot a¤ect it. In this respect, the model fails to capture a potentially genuine pro-competitive e¤ect of the crowding of variety space.
Second, the ideal variety approach does not impose su¢ cient restrictions on h( ) to pin down the properties of h , and therefore the relationship between " and n. 28 Speci…cally, is the assumption 0 h > 0 plausible? Note that M RS(e !; !) = h( (!; e !)) implies that, in order for Lancaster's model to deliver a pro-competitive e¤ect, consumer preferences must feature an ever increasing distance elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution between e ! and !. It is hard to provide a rationale for this assumption, which seems no more plausible than the opposite assumption of a decreasing distance elasticity, which would however deliver an anti-competitive e¤ect.
We summarize the main results in the following Proposition 6 When preferences are heterogeneous across consumers and are of the ideal variety type, as in Lancaster (1979) , a rise in market size does not a¤ ect markups when
Lancaster's compensation function is isoelastic. A rise in market size is instead pro- 2 7 Recall that, in a symmetric monopolistic competition equilibrium, the relationship between L and n is given by n = L= ". 2 8 Only in the limit case in which n goes to in…nity, and due to the (rather ad hoc) assumptions h(0) = 1 and h 0 (0) = 0, the aggregate demand elasticity is increasing in n (and goes to in…nite). This requires a situation, unfeasible under a positive …xed cost, in which the circumference of the circle is full and the aggregate demand for each …rm is in…nitesimal.
competitive (anti-competitive) when Lancaster's compensation function features an increasing (decreasing) distance elasticity.
Strategic Interaction
The Dixit-Stiglitz assumption that each …rm treats (the marginal utility of income) as a constant removes a direct channel whereby an increase in the number of …rms may raise the perceived demand elasticity ". Instead, in a model with strategic interactions, …rms properly treat as a function of the price vector (i.e., = (p)) and demand elasticity no longer coincides with the elasticity of substitution.
Consider …rst our baseline setting with Bertrand competition, in which …rms set prices.
In a symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, …rms perceive the actual demand elasticity (see (70) in the Appendix):
Note that @" b =@n > 0, which captures the direct pro-competitive channel induced by strategic interaction. Thus, the pricing equation is:
where @m b =@n < 0, and @m b =@c ? 0 , m 0 ? 0 , 0 7 0.
Consider now the case of Cournot competition, in which …rms set production levels.
Multiplying both sides of the …rst-order conditions for utility maximization (u 0 (c i ) = p i ) by c i , adding up and using the budget constraint ( P j p j c j = w = 1) yields:
Using (54) in the …rst-order conditions yields the following inverse demand system:
Marginal revenue is therefore given by:
and is decreasing in c i under our assumptions that r 00 < 0 and r 0 = u 00 c + u 0 > 0.
In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, each …rm chooses its quantity to satisfy the …rst-order condition (@R i =@c i ) =L = under a correct conjecture about the quantities produced by its competitors. Then, (56) implies that, in any symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
By (55) and (57), the pricing equation is thus:
where @m c =@n < 0, and @m c =@c ? 0 , m 0 ? 0 , 0 7 0. Accordingly, Cournotian …rms perceive a demand elasticity equal to 29
We can use the pricing equations, (53) 
where s = b; c. Di¤erentiating (60) yields:
Thus, applying Cramer's rule,
where D s is the determinant of the …rst matrix on the LHS of (61). As shown in the Appendix,
where @c s =@( =L) = 0 only for s = c and n = 2. 30 Thus, the comparative statics results delivered by the baseline model hold also in the presence of Bertrand and Cournot competition. This allows us to study the competitive e¤ects of market size expansion (a fall in =L) and productivity growth (a fall in the marginal cost ). Note …rst that
where @m s =@n < 0 and (63) imply that the second term on the RHS is always positive.
It follows that @m s =@ ( =L) > 0 for 0 0, as in this case @m s =@c 0. Thus, a rise in market size is pro-competitive when preferences are DES or CES. Instead, as shown in the Appendix, @m s =@ ( =L) < 0 for 0 > 0, unless n is small. Thus, as in the baseline model, an increase in market size is generally anti-competitive with IES preferences.
Finally, note that 
Discussion
Strategic interaction with additive preferences seems to yield the same competitive e¤ects illustrated in Section 2.1 for IES/DES preferences. In particular, market size expansion is still generally anti-competitive when preferences are IES. Moreover, the competitive e¤ects of a fall in the marginal cost are still generally the opposite of those of a rise in market size, which implies, e.g., that with DES preferences a fall in the marginal cost of exporting still leads to higher markups on foreign sales.
When preferences are CES, instead, strategic interaction naturally leads to a procompetitive e¤ect of market size expansion, whereas marginal costs have no impact on markups. Moreover, CES preferences lead to simple closed-form solutions, both with
Bertrand competition (Yang and Heijdra, 1993; Eckel, 2008) and Cournot competition:
The above results suggest that there seems to be no reason to move beyond the CES when allowing for strategic interaction.
Finally note that, by (52) and (59), independent of the assumptions about preferences, the competitive e¤ects arising from strategic interactions can be relevant only when the number of …rms is small, or else the impact on markups of a rise in n becomes negligible.
However, as forcefully argued by Dixit and Stiglitz (1993) , assuming that n is small is problematic in a monopolistic competition setting. In particular, if the number of …rms is small enough to induce them to interact strategically, it is unclear why they do not also engage in collusion and entry deterrence, thereby preventing the free entry of …rms. By the same token, it is actually unclear why we should expect signi…cant competitive e¤ects in a market situation in which the number of …rms is large enough to make sense of the free-entry condition postulated in monopolistic competition models.
Conclusion
We have studied competitive, selection and aggregate productivity e¤ects in monopolistic competition. We have argued that allowing for a variable elasticity of substitution in an otherwise standard Dixit-Stiglitz setup with additive preferences, an approach advocated by a recent literature, involves implausible assumptions about consumer behavior and inconsistent competitive e¤ects. We have also shown that, in the presence of trade costs, Melitz-type selection e¤ects are robust, but only when preferences are CES they are unambiguously associated to aggregate productivity gains. Finally, we have argued that allowing for non-additive preferences, for the "crowding" of the variety space and for strategic interactions does not obviously lead to more robust and plausible competitive e¤ects in monopolistic competition.
Given that markups are hardly observable, and thus their empirical estimation is to be closely guided by theory, it is crucial that the latter builds on plausible assumptions and mechanisms. Our current ignorance of how to plausibly model competitive e¤ects in monopolistic competition suggests that departing from CES preferences, which overlook these e¤ects, may turn out to be a move in the wrong direction. We view this warning as the most important message of our paper.
Appendix
Demand Elasticity and Elasticity of Substitution
In this Section we show how demand elasticity and the elasticity of substitution are related. 
where Y is income, c ij = @c i =@p j and c iY = @c i =@Y . In elasticity terms, (67) implies:
where i = p i c i =Y; " iY = @ ln c i =@ ln Y; " ii = @ ln c i =@ ln p i and " ij = @ ln c i =@ ln p j are, respectively, good i's expenditure share, income elasticity, own-price and cross-price demand 3 1 See Blackorby and Russell (1989) for a discussion of the elasticity of substitution.
elasticity with respect to good j. 32 Using (66) and (67) yields:
Thus, good i's demand elasticity can be written in terms of the elasticity of substitution and cross-price elasticity with respect to another good j, and of the di¤erence between the corresponding income e¤ects, (" jY " iY ) i . 33 The expression in (69) drastically simpli…es when there is no numeraire (as in Krugman, 1979 and in Section 2) and p i = p for all i, which implies c i = c for all i. In this case, e " ii = (n 1)e " ij , e " ij = ij =n, " ji = ( ij 1) =n and: 34
Another simple case arises when preferences are quasi-linear, i.e., U (c 0 ; u(c 0 ) = c 0 + u(c 0 ) (as in Section 3.1). In this case, there are no income e¤ects on the demand for non-numeraire goods, hence " ji = e " ji = ( ij + e " i0 ) =n and:
More generally, it is possible to show that, for a symmetric consumption pattern over c 0 ,
and (71) are special cases of the general expression:
Thus, for a wide class of utility functions, demand elasticity is approximately equal to the elasticity of substitution for n large.
A general result is that, if u( ) is additive (i.e., if u(c 0 ) = P n i=1 u(c i )), then, for c i = c j (i; j = 1; :::; n, i 6 = j),
implying that the demand elasticity perceived under the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption is al- 3 2 For expositional purposes, in this Appendix it proves convenient to de…ne the demand elasticity as "ii = @ ln ci=@ ln pi, rather than "i = @ ln ci=@ ln pi, as in the main text. 3 3 This latter term disappears if U ( ) is homothetic (as "jY = "iY = 1) or quasi-linear with respect to the numeraire (as "jY = "iY = 0), or if pi = pj (as "jY = "iY by the symmetry of preferences over e c 0). More generally, unless either ci or cj are disproportionate, ("jY "iY ) i is an order of magnitude smaller than 1=n. 3 4 The same expression holds in the presence of a numeraire, provided that preferences are Cobb-Douglas with respect to the numeraire, i.e., when U (c0; u(c 0)) = c 0 u(c 0) 1 , where 0 < < 1 and u( ) is homogeneous. The reason is that in this case the income and substitution e¤ects partially cancel out (i.e., 0i = "0Y = 1, see below).
ways equal to the elasticity of substitution at a symmetric consumption. To see this, note that di¤erentiating the …rst-order conditions
where is the relevant Lagrangian multiplier and U u = @U=@u, yields: where U u0 = @ 2 U=@u@c 0 , U uu = @ 2 U=@u 2 and i = @ =@p i . Subtracting the second expression from the …rst, exploiting the symmetry of price e¤ects implied by the compensated demand functions (i.e., e c ij = e c ji ) and manipulating yields: Note that, for p i = p j , then, due to symmetry of preferences over c 0 , c i = c j , i = j , e c hi = e c hj (h = 0; :::; n, i 6 = h 6 = j) and e c ii = e c jj . Thus (73) boils down to (72). Total demand for …rm ! is therefore given by:
Implicit di¤erentiation of the two-equation system in (75) yields:
Note that, at a symmetric equilibrium, p(! l ) = p(! r ) = p(!),
, and d = 1=n. Substituting into (77) and (78) yields:
thus leading to the expression for the demand elasticity "(q(!)) reported in the main text.
Comparative Statics of the Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria
We now prove the results in Proposition 7. 
Next, using (83) in (62) yields:
implying that sign n @m c @ o = sign fm 0 g = sign f 0 g.
